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THE IMPACT OF NEGLECTING INDIGENT DEFENSE ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
MICHAEL BARRETT* 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal justice decision-making does not begin with a police officer, a 
prosecutor, or even a judge; rather, it begins with an appropriator—the 
legislator or legislators who determine how much funding should be dedicated 
and for what purpose. At the most basic level, the appropriator can be 
described as pushing the equivalent of a shopping cart through the criminal 
justice store, up and down aisles lined with an ever-increasing array of options: 
prison beds, police officers, drug courts, probation and parole officers, 
electronic monitoring devices, victim advocates, mental health services, and 
yes, even public defenders. The appropriator has to decide precisely how much 
funding to dedicate to each specific function in order to achieve the 
overarching goals of enhancing public safety and preserving an equitable 
system of justice. 
These options are each represented by constituency groups with varying 
degrees of influence over the budgetary process. Police officers and 
prosecutors traditionally have considerable sway, and perhaps rightfully so, 
with public safety providing a compelling case for funding that translates into a 
simple and resonant message with voters. Conversely, and if history is any 
indication, criminal defense lawyers for the poor have very little clout when it 
comes to attracting resources from elected officials. Regardless, these groups 
engage appropriators each budgetary cycle on why they should receive 
additional funding. Given the mutual exclusivity with which budgets are 
generally constructed, greater funding for one often comes at the expense of 
another; that is to say, an additional dollar for corrections could mean a dollar 
less for treatment courts, and so on. Adding to the complexity of the process, 
these groups—each a spoke in the criminal justice wheel—make their case to 
appropriators who are often not well-versed on effective public safety 
strategies or emerging best practices, or even how to scale funding decisions to 
achieve the aforementioned public safety and criminal justice goals. 
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The regrettable practice is then to formulate individual budgets in a 
vacuum; for example, to develop probation and parole’s budget without 
scrutinizing what is driving its request or how an adjustment to funding in 
other areas might improve outcomes and decrease the need for resources. Data 
is regularly overlooked in favor of politics, and funding priorities are instead 
set by those with the greatest influence. 
This approach to criminal justice system funding, not surprisingly, leads to 
poor outcomes. The following is an illustration of how traditional budget 
construction often fails to achieve the universal goals of public safety and a fair 
system of justice. The case for review involves the State of Missouri and how a 
fiscally conservative state that is self-styled as “tough on crime,” pro-liberty, 
and anti-Government, has achieved opposite results. 
I.  UNDERFUNDING INDIGENT DEFENSE AND THE ESCALATION OF THE STATE 
PRISON BUDGET 
Throughout the country, in red and blue states alike, indigent defense finds 
itself at the end of the line when it comes to budget priorities. The immediate 
past two U.S. Attorneys General, Holder and Lynch, have both described the 
state of indigent defense as something of a national crisis.1 Even given the 
epidemic of anemic funding in support of the right to counsel, however, there 
are few states where the situation is more dire than in Missouri. 
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States Constitution to all 
persons facing criminal prosecution.2 Every state is obligated to provide 
counsel to poor persons who face the loss of liberty by virtue of a pending 
criminal charge.3 Given this, one might draw the assumption that public 
defense funding would fare better in a state where the prevailing political 
ideology is that government should only deliver those functions that it is 
required to perform under the state and federal constitutions; however, that is 
not the case. 
The State of Missouri ranks forty-ninth among the fifty states in the 
funding it provides for indigent defense, spending just $5.85 per capita.4 
Meanwhile, other fiscally conservative states that are contiguous to Missouri 
 
 1. See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Brennan Center for Justice, New York 
University School of Law: Indigent Defense Reform (Nov. 17, 2009), https://www.brennancen 
ter.org/print/5287 [http://perma.cc/356W-CZDY]; Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at 
the White House, Washington, D.C.: Convening on Incarceration and Poverty (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-white-
house-convening-incarceration-and [http://perma.cc/6R2F-ETAW]. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI & XIV, § 1. 
 3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
 4. Michael Barrett, Message from the Director, in STATE OF MO. PUB. DEF. COMM’N, 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016); Missouri, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-
your-state/missouri/ [http://perma.cc/U9H9-RKG4]. 
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provide significantly more generous funding, some even double or triple that 
of Missouri. For instance: Arkansas contributes $9.19 per capita;5 Iowa $17.49 
per capita;6 Kansas $10.94 per capita;7 Nebraska $13.37 per capita;8 Oklahoma 
$8.61 per capita;9 and Tennessee $11.36 per capita.10 
As a result, the Missouri State Public Defender’s (MSPD) per-attorney 
caseloads are extremely high. In Fiscal Year 2016, the MSPD was assigned 
76,150 new trial division cases, about a twelve percent increase over 2015, 
together with 31,738 cases that were carried forward from the previous fiscal 
year.11 These cases were handled by just 313 trial division attorneys for an 
average annual caseload of about 344 cases per attorney.12 Bearing in mind 
that the often-cited suggested maximum caseload is 150 felony cases per 
attorney, per year, Missouri’s assistant public defenders often maintain 
caseloads that are more than double the recommended best practice.13 
In 2014, the American Bar Association enlisted the accounting firm 
RubinBrown to study the MSPD’s caseload in light of its existing number of 
attorneys, and the study was later publicized as “The Missouri Project” 
report.14 As part of this process, the MSPD became the first statewide defender 
organization to require its attorneys to electronically keep track of their time in 
order to generate specific data on how much time they were spending on each 
attorney-related task for each given case type.15 In other words, the MSPD 
 
 5. Arkansas, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/arkansas/ [http://perma.cc/ 
T8P8-HS9W]. 
 6. Iowa, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/iowa/ [http://perma.cc/D4RQ-
3CKT]. 
 7. Kansas, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/kansas/ [http://perma.cc/B6 
TS-HTFZ]. 
 8. Nebraska, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/nebraska/ [http://perma.cc/ 
S7UJ-XG6A]. 
 9. Oklahoma, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/oklahoma/ [http://perma. 
cc/634F-8B39]. 
 10. Tennessee, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/tennessee/ [http://perma.cc 
/2TXT-4LZG]. 
 11. FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
 12. Id. 
 13. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF 
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
COMMITTEE 66 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U4D2-44M6] (“In its report on the Courts, the [National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals] recommended the following maximum annual 
caseloads for a public defender office . . . .”). 
 14. RUBINBROWN LLP, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 5–6 (2014) http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_
project_report.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZB5-5FZR]. 
 15. Id. 
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tracked how much time was being dedicated to meeting with clients, 
investigating a case, performing motion practice, attending court appearances, 
and so forth. 
This data was then juxtaposed with similar data provided by private 
defense attorneys. Using the Delphi methodology, a business forecasting tool, 
RubinBrown used these two data sets to establish thresholds that detail 
precisely how much time an attorney should be spending on a given task for a 
given case type.16 Then it applied the MSPD’s existing resources (i.e., the 
number of attorneys) to the number of cases assigned by case type, which 
revealed precisely how many additional attorneys the MSPD needed to provide 
competent representation. Using the number of cases assigned to the MSPD 
when the report was released in 2014, this calculation resulted in a need for 
290 additional attorneys; two years later, when caseloads increased about 
twelve percent, that number rose to more than 330 additional attorneys.17 
Nonetheless, in the few years since the release of the Missouri Project, the 
MSPD has not received funding for a single additional attorney. 
Missouri’s informed neglect for the rights of the poor has been met with 
stark criticism. In July of 2015, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice issued a report detailing the repeated denial of due 
process for poor children, particularly children of color, in St. Louis County, 
pointing to the “staggering caseload of the sole public defender assigned to 
handle all indigent juvenile delinquency cases.”18 This finding comes on the 
heels of a 2013 study by the National Juvenile Defender Center that described 
Missouri’s indigent defense system as being in crisis after having “endured at 
least two decades of crushing caseloads and inadequate resources.”19 Still yet, 
no additional attorneys were added. 
Therefore, the fact that people are systematically denied basic 
constitutional rights has not been enough to persuade elected leaders to follow 
their own political ideology as it relates to an individual’s fundamental right to 
liberty. What remains, then, is to demonstrate to the appropriator, to say 
nothing of the taxpayer, how underfunding public defense indirectly causes 
budgets to increase elsewhere to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. In 
other words, public defender resources should not be viewed in isolation like 
 
 16. Id. at 17–24. 
 17. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEF. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2014); 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 4, at 5. 
 18. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
FAMILY COURT, ST. LOUIS, MO. 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/ 
2015/07/31/stlouis_findings_7-31-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JKX-VFCM]. 
 19. Mary Ann Scali, et al., Nat’l Juvenile Defender Ctr., Missouri: Justice Rationed. An 
Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Juvenile Defense Representation in Delinquency 
Proceedings 7 (Spring 2013), http://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Missouri-Executive-
Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/P8PY-6B9D]. 
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other funding recipients such as a department of transportation, where a 
decline in funding may only mean opting not to resurface a particular stretch of 
highway. Though the road may desperately need it, putting the project off a 
year seldom drives cost increases in other budget line items. 
By contrast, when a public defender has too many clients, as they do, it 
makes it impossible to perform even some of the most basic attorney-related 
functions. For instance, attorneys may not have sufficient time to talk to 
witnesses, closely scrutinize the evidence, request a bond reduction, file 
motions in limine or motions to suppress based on information gleaned from 
the client, or even work to develop an alternate sentencing option to state 
prison. It is a denial of competent counsel to be sure, but is also a myopic 
budgeting practice that fails to account for the generation of substantial 
unintended costs. 
Because these important functions are not sufficiently performed for tens 
of thousands of defendants annually, Missouri has climbed to eighth highest in 
the nation in its incarceration rate;20 more critical, however, is the fact that the 
state prison population is no longer dominated by individuals who pose a 
public safety threat. Then there are the collateral costs that are manufactured 
even beyond the criminal justice system. Not only do non-violent offenders, by 
virtue of their incarceration, become a drain on taxpayer funds at a cost of 
about $22,350 a year, per inmate21 but also, many of these individuals cease 
contributing to the tax base themselves. What’s more, many of their families 
left behind due to their incarceration then come to rely on public assistance, 
thereby needlessly expanding the rolls of individuals dependent upon the state. 
And so indigent defense, if not funded to scale, becomes a force multiplier for 
needless government spending. 
This is precisely what has occurred in Missouri, where the prison budget 
has increased substantially in the last decade. In Fiscal Year 2004, the Missouri 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) housed 29,364 inmates with a budget of 
$575,700,362.22 By December 31, 2015, the DOC’s population rose to 32,330 
inmates with a budget of $725,156,473.23 Despite this $200 million increase, 
 
 20. State-by-State Data, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/the-
facts/#rankings?dataset-option=SIR [http://perma.cc/4T6K-ZRKD]. 
 21. The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, Missouri, VERA INSTITUTE 
OF JUSTICE (Jan. 2012), http://archive.vera.org/files/price-of-prisons-missouri-fact-sheet.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/AK94-B7VQ]. 
 22. MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, A PROFILE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND SUPERVISED 
OFFENDER POPULATION ON JUNE 30, 2013, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2014), https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/ 
publications/Offender%20Profile%20FY13.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV93-UU6Q]; MO. DEP’T OF 
CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 10 (2013), https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/publications/ 
AR2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/32NA-SRET]. 
 23. MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 9 (2015), https://doc.mo.gov/ 
Documents/publications/AR2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4SQ-VFLZ]; MO. DEP’T OF 
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the Missouri DOC has repeatedly stated in the past several years that its inmate 
population has risen beyond operational capacity, presenting yet another 
critical budgetary issue for state leaders: build a new prison at a cost of more 
than $100 million, plus the personnel and other costs associated with operating 
the prison, or adopt a new approach to criminal justice. 
Repeated admissions by legislators continue to reveal a misguided belief 
that the rising cost of incarceration is uncontrollable; that increases to the 
prison population are little more than a reflection of the current crime problem. 
This position fails to recognize the policies and funding decisions that truly 
drive the rate of incarceration, such as unchecked local discretion, sentencing 
practices, and opting not to fund indigent defense. Since about 2009, and 
despite the skyrocketing prison budget, the MSPD’s resources have remained 
relatively flat at about one-half of one percent of the total state budget.24 
Considered together, Missouri’s position as the state with the eighth highest 
incarceration rate nationally and second to last amount of public defender 
funding creates a correlation that is difficult to ignore between underfunding 
indigent defense and the $200 million increase in corrections spending.25 
In addition to fulfilling the state’s obligation to provide the right to counsel 
to poor persons, the practical utility of a meaningful defense is that it helps the 
state, by way of the adversarial process that is the design of America’s criminal 
justice system, to distinguish between those who require institutionalization, at 
considerable cost to taxpayers, from those who could be managed through less 
resource-intensive means within the community. Relative minor upward 
adjustments to the public defender budget in Missouri have the potential to 
save tens, or even hundreds, of millions in taxpayer dollars. Moreover, as the 
following section will demonstrate, funding indigent defense to scale can also 
improve public safety outcomes. 
II.  OVER-INCARCERATION AND THE RISE OF VIOLENT CRIME 
There is a potential counterargument that such considerable increases to 
the prison budget are not, in and of itself, a bad thing, and that retort lies in the 
state’s crime rate. If crime, particularly violent crime, decreased commensurate 
 
CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 10 (2014), https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/publications/ 
AR2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YPN-6L8S]. 
 24. The Missouri Public Defender’s Fiscal Year 2017 operating budget is $40,703,780 out of 
the total Fiscal Year 2017 Missouri operating budget of $9,633,728,780. See OFFICE OF 
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF BUDGET & PLANNING, GOVERNOR JEREMIAH W. NIXON, THE 
MISSOURI BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2017 9 (2016), https://oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/FY_2017_ 
Executive_Budget_download.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XWS-V95D]; H.B. 12, 98th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015), https://legiscan.com/MO/text/HB12/id/1290897/Missouri-2016-HB12-En 
rolled.pdf [http://perma.cc/BD55-SHQR]. 
 25. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 15; In Your State, GIDEON AT 50, http://gideonat 
50.org/in-your-state/#per-capita-spending [http://perma.cc/FU5K-2D6H]. 
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with the increase to Missouri’s corrections budget, then it could be said that 
investing in corrections is an effective public safety strategy to reduce 
victimization. But that is not the case. 
It has long been believed that the more individuals a state incarcerates, the 
safer its citizens will be. Certainly, it is intuitive to think that the more law 
breakers are removed from the street, the fewer law breakers there will be to 
victimize people. However, what makes this position intuitive is that it relies 
on the belief that those who are incarcerated are predominately violent 
offenders. But, this condition precedent largely has not been met in Missouri, 
making it a stark example of how an ideologically-driven budget achieves poor 
outcomes and wastes millions of dollars. 
The last reported collection of FBI annual crime data reveals that Missouri 
ranks eleventh overall in violent crime, which includes the offenses of murder, 
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.26 Of the seventy-six cities with 
populations greater than 250,000, Missouri’s two largest cities finish fourth 
and tenth respectively, with St. Louis having the highest murder rate among 
large cities in the U.S.27 However, Missouri’s problem with violent crime is 
not confined to the major urban areas. Springfield is among the top ten 
medium-sized cities for violent crime in the U.S., and the City of Wellston 
ranks second nationally in both violent crime and murder among cities of 
between 1000 and 10,000 people.28 
One of the reasons that Missouri has both a large prison population and a 
high violent crime rate is the percentage of resources dedicated to individuals 
who do not pose a public safety risk. Like in any state budget, there are finite 
resources, and so appropriators should take special care to avoid wasting 
critical dollars on efforts that do not yield a significant public safety benefit. 
Regrettably, that has largely not occurred in Missouri. 
As the national incarceration rate decreased from 2008 to 2014, Missouri’s 
prison population has steadily increased.29 According to a Missouri DOC 
report, that increase has largely been made up of non-violent offenders. From 
2009 to 2014, there was a 3.2% increase among violent offenders, with just a 
1.4% increase among sex offenders; yet, those incarcerated for non-violent 
 
 26. 2014 Crime in the United States, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-
in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-5 [https://perma.cc/63M6-EF2G]. 
 27. Most Dangerous Cities in the United States, WORLD ATLAS (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/most-dangerous-cities-in-the-united-states.html [http://perma. 
cc/433A-F79U]. 
 28. Mason Johnson, FBI’s Violent Crime Statistics for Every City in America, CBS 
CHICAGO (Oct. 22, 2015 5:00 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2015/10/22/violent-crime-statis 
tics-for-every-city-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/MP97-H4ZZ]. 
 29. MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, A PROFILE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND SUPERVISED 
OFFENDER POPULATION ON JUNE 30, 2014, at 1 (Jan. 14, 2015), http://doc.mo.gov/Documents/ 
publications/Offender%20Profile%20FY14.pdf [http://perma.cc/9X7L-3KFD]. 
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offenses increased by 11.2%.30 According to the same report, about 47.6% of 
Missouri’s prison population was comprised of inmates incarcerated for a non-
violent offense.31 
The average length of sentences changed during this time as well, with a 
slight -0.4% decrease in the length of prison sentences for violent offenders, 
but a 4.3% increase in sentence length among non-violent offenders, including 
a 17% increase in sentence length for DWI offenders.32 As a result, the profile 
of the Missouri prison population is growing increasingly non-violent, which 
means that there are fewer resources to cope with the state’s violent crime rate. 
Even using the low end of cost estimates, incarcerating roughly 15,195 
non-violent inmates cost taxpayers well over $300 million annually.33 This is a 
remarkable amount of money. Repurposing just $100 million for strategic law 
enforcement efforts, to include solving unsolved violent crime, performing 
evidence-based crime prevention, executing warrants on violent individuals, 
and eliminating the rape kit backlog, could drive drastic reductions in 
Missouri’s violent crime rate. When considered in zero-sum terms, the issue 
becomes less about whether someone should be incarcerated in state prison for 
a non-violent offense, but rather whether this is the best use of more than $300 
million in limited public safety resources. 
In both economic and public policy terms, it is hard for decision makers to 
argue that incarcerating non-violent offenders is the best use of hundreds of 
millions in limited public safety resources. Therefore, budget strategies should 
be implemented to avoid escalating costs that are not directly tied to decreasing 
victimization and improving public safety. Adequately funding public defense 
is one such strategy because public defenders work to avoid prison, not just for 
the innocent, but for the thousands of individuals who are more effectively 
managed within their communities, through problem-solving courts and other 
effective alternative sentencing options. 
CONCLUSION 
The cost of corrections does not grow on its own. Indeed, such 
considerable increases are a result of policy choices and politically driven 
funding decisions that weaken efforts that could right-size the ever-increasing 
prison population, such as an adequately funded system of criminal defense. 
There is a need to replace the existing method for constructing budgets with a 
data driven approach that evaluates the entirety of the criminal justice system 
so that taxpayers get the most public safety and justice out of every dollar 
 
 30. Id. at 28. 
 31. Id. at 30. 
 32. Id. at 29. 
 33. See supra notes 21 and 29 (taking 15,195 inmates, 47% of the Missouri DOC population, 
at a reported cost of $22,350 per inmate, per year). 
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spent. Only then will Missouri, and other states, come to decrease their reliance 
on costly programs, such as incarceration, and improve public safety outcomes. 
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